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This paper introduces the approach of the Freiburg model to quantify accrued-to-date 
liabilities (ADL) of public pension schemes. The presented framework has been applied to 
carry out benchmark calculations for 19 EU member states on behalf of the Eurostat/ECB 
Contact Group on Pensions. We will show that the Freiburg model represents a valuable 
instrument to calculate pension schemes’ ADL on a relatively small data base. Furthermore, 
limitations and possible extensions of the model will be outlined. 
                                                            
* Research Center for Generational Contracts, Freiburg University, 79085 Freiburg, Germany (Fax: +49-761-
203 2290; christoph.mueller@generationenvertraege.de). We would like to thank Christian Hagist for valu-
able comments. All errors remain our own.  1  Introduction 
Demographic developments present a major future risk for the public pension systems of 
most developed countries. Continuously increasing life expectancy and large age groups 
of the so-called baby-boomer generation in combination with low fertility rates since the 
mid-1970s will cause considerable enhancements of the old-age dependency ratio which 
means that public pension systems organized on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) principle will be 
forced to either raise contribution rates or taxes, or shorten future replacement rates. This 
trend raises two important issues both of which address the topic of projecting future 
pension payments. The first issue refers to the consequences of the demographic 
development for future retirees and contributors and examines the sustainability of the 
pension scheme by confronting the present value of future pension payments – which can 
be regarded as open-system gross liabilities (OSGL) – with the present value of future 
contributions. The result can be considered as the open-system net liabilities (OSNL) of a 
pension system. 
The second issue refers to the question of measuring the public pension entitlements of 
private households until today. From a fiscal perspective, these entitlements are equal to 
the accrued-to-date liabilities (ADL) of a public pension system. These liabilities are not an 
indicator of fiscal sustainability, but they display the cost of terminating a PAYG pension 
scheme.
1 Furthermore, they can be used as a tool to quantify the impact of pension 
reforms on private households’ pension entitlements. 
Various estimates of pension liabilities have been conducted in the past, both on an 
international and on a national level. Hagemann and Nicoletti (1989), van den Noord and 
Herd (1993) and Kuné et al. (1993) belonged to the first to present pension liabilities on an 
international level, followed by Chand and Jaeger (1996) and Fredriksen (2001). One of the 
latest international estimates was presented by Holzmann et al. (2004) who examined the 
public pension systems of 35 low and middle income countries by applying the Pension 
Reform Option Simulation Toolkit (PROST) developed by the World Bank. On a national 
level, several surveys have been published for the case of German pension liabilities. 
Werding (2006), Ehrentraut (2006) and Heidler (2009) show pension liabilities for the 
                                                            
1 See Franco (1995), p. 3. 
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 German statutory pension scheme,
2 Besendorfer et al. (2006) and Braakmann et al. (2008) 
calculate pension liabilities for the civil servants pension schemes.
3 
In this paper we will concentrate on the second of the two concepts mentioned above, the 
calculation of ADL of a pension scheme. These specific pension liabilities become 
increasingly important not least because of the recent update of the 1993 System of 
National Accounts (SNA). According to this new legislation – approved by the UN Statistical 
Commission in February/March 2007 – (implicit) pension liabilities of social security 
pension funds have to be recorded in a supplementary table of the National Accounts.
4 
Against this background, the Research Center for Generational Contracts of Freiburg 
University (RCG) carried out benchmark calculations of public pension liabilities for 19 
member states of the European Union. The respective survey on behalf of the Eurostat/ECB 
Contact Group on Pensions has been finalized in January 2009.
5 With this paper we want 
to introduce the applied model of this study.  
We will proceed as follows: In section 2, we provide a detailed description of the so-called 
Freiburg model which has been developed by the RCG in order to estimate the ADL of a 
pension scheme. This section also contains a detailed explanation of the differences 
between accumulated benefit obligations (ABO) and projected benefit obligations (PBO) 
and how these differences have been implemented in the model. Section 3 describes the 
data necessary for the application of the Freiburg model and introduces the basic 
assumptions. In section 4 we specify the limitations of the Freiburg model and show 
possible extensions. The paper finishes with a summary of our findings and a short outlook 
for future research. 
                                                            
2 Werding (2006) calculates both accrued-to-date and open-system net liabilities, while Ehrentraut (2006) and 
Heidler (2009) focus on open-system net liabilities.  
3 It has to be pointed out that Besendorfer et al. (2006) estimate liabilities only for the pensions of the civil 
servants of the federal states and the municipalities in Germany (ADL as well as OSGL), whereas Braakmann 
et al. (2008) present figures for the civil servants of the central government only (ADL). Therefore the findings 
of these two surveys should not be compared. 
4 Within the EU, it is also planned to produce a specific section on pensions in the revised 1995 European 
System of National and Regional Accounts (1995 ESA) which shall follow the updated 1993 SNA. For a 
description of the recent steps taken to reform the 1993 SNA see Mink (2007), p. 203 et seq. For a short 
portrayal of the reasons to change the 1993 SNA see Mink and Rother (2007) or Semeraro (2007).  
5 See Müller et al. (2009). For further information on the background of the Contact Group see Eurostat/ECB 
Contact Group (2009), p. 4 et seq. 
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 2  The basics of the Freiburg model 
In this section we explain the methodology of the Freiburg model step-by-step.
6 
Furthermore we draw the attention to the difference between ABO and PBO; we will show 
that the size of ADL considerably depends on the choice between these two concepts.
7 
2.1  The methodology of the Freiburg model 
The starting point for the Freiburg model is the method of generational accounting.
8 In 
general this method can be used for a wide variety of purposes. For this project, the 
method is applied for public pension schemes
9 in isolation and for the group of existing 
retirees and current contributors (future retirees) only.
10 Additionaly, the standard method 
is modified in order to account for the accrued-to-date amount of benefits instead of 
considering future pension benefits in total. Our calculations include old-age pensions, 
disability pensions and survivor pensions. Any kind of means-tested social existence is 
excluded – as far as feasible. 
The core presumption is a projection of per capita future pension benefits based on 
today’s existing retirees’ benefits. We outline below the entire calculation procedure in five 
steps. 
Step 1: First of all, age-sex-specific projections of base year’s population need to be 
calculated. The demographic model used to generate these projections is based on a 
discrete and deterministic formulation of the cohort component method.
11 
The three major determinants of future population changes are in general fertility, 
mortality and migration. Since ADL regard only rights accrued by existing and former 
                                                            
6 The original version of the Freiburg model has first been introduced in Heidler et al. (2008), p. 5 et seq. 
7 At this point it has to be emphasized that we actually do not measure pension entitlements of private 
households in a sense of dues which can be legally claimed by a single individual. We rather derive the extent 
of liabilities from the amount of expected future pension expenditures. 
8 This method was developed by Auerbach et al. (1991, 1992 and 1994). See Raffelhüschen (1999) and 
Bonin  (2001) for a detailed depiction of theory and application as well as limitations of the method of 
generational accounting. 
9 The terms “public pension scheme”, “government pension scheme” and “pension scheme in general 
government” are used as synonyms. However, we differentiate between two different types of schemes. The 
government employer pension scheme indicates a pension scheme for civil servants, whereas a social 
security pension scheme describes a general pension scheme. For a discussion of the definition of 
government pension schemes see Eurostat/ European Central Bank Task Force (2008), p. 20 et seq. 
10 For a close look on the application of generational accounting to public pension schemes see 
Ehrentraut (2006) and Heidler (2009) who employed the concept of open-system net liabilities to investigate 
the sustainability of the German statutory pension scheme. 
11 For a detailed description of the demographic model applied see Bonin (2001), p. 245 et seq. 
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 workers until the base year, migration of the base year population is irrelevant.
12 The 
development of survival rates is considered by adjusting the initial set of survival rates with 
an exponential adjustment procedure.
13 
Step 2: We start with the estimation of the average age-sex-specific existing retirees’ 
benefits in the base year. As mentioned before, the projection of these pension benefits is 
the centre piece of the calculations since we develop the accrued-to-date claims by 
modification of the existing retirees’ benefits. It has to be emphasized that in our 
calculations we only look at average individuals within the respective age groups, i.e., we 
do not separate into varying income groups. In fact, we separate the calculation of age-
sex-specific benefits into existing and future retirees, assuming that an average 
representative of an age group is to some extent an existing and a future retiree in every 
year of his or her life-cycle. 
Before going further into detail we briefly sketch out the projection approach for existing 
retirees’ benefits. First of all, the benefits are calculated by distributing the aggregated 
amount of today’s pension expenditures to the different cohorts in retirement age. By this 
procedure we create an age-sex-specific benefits’ cross-section profile generated from the 
budget and micro data of the observed country.
14 This profile includes payments 
regarding old-age pensions, disability pensions and survivor pensions.
15 Secondly, these 
average existing retirees’ benefits are projected into the future by assuming them to 
remain constant over time except for indexation of the benefits.
16 
Formally, the estimation of the existing retirees’ benefits is based on the following identity:  






Pp k b k C
                                                            
12 In the pilot study of this project fertility rates were set to zero as well (see Heidler et al. (2008)). However, 
from our current point of view this is not an adequate procedure as it disregards orphan’s pensions. 
Furthermore, there are regulations in certain pension schemes which make it necessary to include 
assumptions regarding fertility rates into our calculations (e.g. the sustainability factor in Germany, see 
section 2.1). Therefore fertility has been implemented in our model. One may interpose that future migration 
could also have an impact on regulations in certain pension schemes. Following this argument, in schemes 
where this might be the case (again, e.g. the sustainability factor in Germany), future migration has been 
taken into consideration. 
13 This procedure is suggested by Pflaumer (1988). See also Bonin (2001), p. 248. 
14 The general data sources will be introduced in section 3.1 of our paper.  
15 In doing so, we are able to take into account survivor pensions in a rather accurate way, compared to most 
other surveys dealing with the measurement of pension liabilities. 
16 Most former surveys apply one constant average retirement age for their calculations instead of an age-
sex-specific pension profile. From our point of view, this approach represents an oversimplification of 
retirement behaviour and leads to inaccurate results. 
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 This identity states that the sum of age-specific individual pension benefits pb,k (in the base 
year  b  of the cohort born in k) weighted with the cohort size Cb,k must equal the 
corresponding macroeconomic pension, denoted by Pb.
17 The problem of equation (1) is 
that it holds only in theory. While macroeconomic data, typically taken from national 
accounting statistics, is relative exact, micro data is in general difficult to gather and tends 
to be afflicted with inaccuracies. To resolve this problem generational accountants 
estimate re-scaled age-sex-specific benefit profiles. 
This is done in two steps. First, age-sex-specific information regarding per capita pension 
benefits has to be collected in order to capture the relative fiscal position of different age 
groups as accurately as possible. The vector of relative pension benefits by age taken from 
the statistics, (τt,t-D, …τt,k, …, τt,t), is then denoted by τt,k.
18 Note that this vector is supposed 
to show only the relative pension position in period t of an individual born in the year k 
and thus imposes less restriction on the accuracy and availability of micro data on the 
absolute level. Second, the estimated relative age distribution is tallied with the 
corresponding aggregate pension benefit Pb by application of a proportional, non-age-
specific benchmarking factor, denoted by ϕ. The relative distribution of pension payments 
is re-evaluated according to 
(2)       ϕτ = ,, bk bk p  
for all living generations b-D ≤ k ≤ b, where ϕ is defined by 











Equation (3) assures that equation (1) is finally satisfied such that the expenditures to 
existing retirees are assigned with age-sex-specific profiles to the base year population.  
Finally, the resulting rescaled average age-sex-specific existing retirees’ benefits are 
projected according to the indexation rules of the respective country: 
(4)    
− =+ ,, (1 )
exis t b
tk bk pp g , 
for all cohorts b-D ≤ k ≤ b living in the base year. 
This equation states that an individual already retired in base year b receives the same 
pension in a specific year t as in the base year b, only corrected by the indexation g of 
                                                            
17 Please note that D represents the maximum age of an individual which is 100 years by our assumption. 
18 For ease of notation we drop the sex-specific notation as from now on. 
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 pension in payment. Furthermore equation (4) implies a “phasing  out” of the stock of 
existing pension benefits since it holds only for all living generations. Thus all existing 
retirees’ pensions of the base year will have disappeared at latest when the youngest 
existing retiree of the base year is dead. 
Step 3: The age-sex-specific pension profile for future retirees, which is the basis for the 
estimation of accrued-to-date entitlements, is calculated by manipulating the base year 
existing retirees’ benefits. This is done in three steps. First, the difference of the existing 
benefits for a consecutive age year (during the base year) provides the pension benefits for 
new retirees.
19 These are valorised for a specific year t. Second, if necessary, a deduction 
factor is used (defined by a reform or for instance inherent like in NDC systems)
20. Third, 
the (cumulated) average future retirees’ benefits are calculated by summing up year-by-
year the new retirees’ benefits and thus accounting for the fact that an individual can 
receive on average for any future year t a new retiree benefit.
21 
Formally, the new retirees benefit   in a specific year t for a cohort k is developed firstly 
by calculating the absolute change in existing retirees benefit of the cohort b-(t-k) (the 
cohort with the same age (t-k) in the base year b) to the cohort one year younger in the 









where v is the valorisation rate according to the benefit formula. On top on that the new 
retirees’ benefits are diminished according to a deduction factor θ , tk of the benefit 
formula. Equation (5) sums up: 
(5)     θ
−
−− −− − =− + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ,, , ( ) , ( 1 ) (1 )
new exis exis t b
tk tk bb t k bb t k pp p v
                                                          
, 
for all living cohorts b-D ≤ k ≤b. 
Finally, the future (existing) retirees’ benefits need to be calculated. This is done by 
cumulating year-by-year the   according to equation (5). Therefore, the age-sex-





19 Note that new retirees’ benefits represent those benefits that are paid for the first time upon retirement in 
a specific year t>b. 
20 For a closer look on the basic structure of notional defined contribution (NDC) pension systems see 
Palmer (2006). 
21 The separation of existing pensions and future pensions (pensions paid out first in the base year or later) 
bears one big advantage: In case of a pension reform which affects only future pensions, only these pensions 
are changed while existing pensions are held constant. 
22 Changes after the age of 67 years are generally set to zero since new retirees’ old-age benefits after the age 
of 67 are negligible. The only exception from this rule is widow’s pensions. 
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 (6)     , 
− =+ + ,1 , (1 )
fut fut new
tk t k tk pp g p ,
for all cohorts b-D ≤ k ≤ b. 
From this equation it follows that the average individual born in the year k receives a 
future benefit in the year t (t>b) which is composed of the pension payment one period 
earlier (t-1) corrected by the growth rate g plus the pensions paid to new retirees in this 
year. Thus, the age-sex-specific benefit profile for future retirees builds up step by step. 
Step 4: Now, in order to meet ADL, only the part of the future pension benefits (of current 
workers) has to be considered which is earned until the base year. This means in turn that 
 must be cut by a factor 
,
new
tk p λ , tk representing the cohort-specific amount of entitlements 
of current contributors in relation to the full entitlements.
23 
Future pension benefits are thus finally defined by 
(7)     λ − =+ + ,1 , , (1 )
fut fut new
tk t k tk tk pp g p , , 
for all cohorts b-D ≤ k ≤ b. 
Note that the accrued-to-date concept requires a definition of the valorisation and 
accruing process for the entitlements. As a matter of principle there are several possibilities 
to account for. Section X2.3X defines the two approaches applied in this survey. 
Step 5: Finally, the ADL of the pension scheme are calculated by discounting and summing 
up the above projected pension benefits over the cohorts living in the base year. 
Thus, the ADLb
  (accrued-to-date liabilities of the baseyear b) can be expressed like the 
following: 



















                                                          
 
This means that every period t the existing retirees pension benefits ( ) and the 
pension rights accrued until the base year ( ) – which are both discounted by the factor 
(1+r) for every future year (t-b) – are multiplied with the number of members of this age 
cohort Ct,k. This is done for every age-group, beginning with the ones born in k=b-D, which 









23 The calculation of the factor 
, tkrequires the knowledge of the average age-sex-specific wage distribution. 
Many other surveys work with one single average wage over the whole career which leads to different 
results. 
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 2.2  Distinguishing between ABO and PBO 
First of all, it has to be made perfectly clear that the difference between ABO and PBO only 
refers to the question of how to project entitlements of individuals not yet retired into the 
future. This means that entitlements of individuals already receiving pensions in the base 
year – and therefore disposing of full pension rights – are not influenced by the choice 
between ABO and PBO at all. 
When we speak of ABO, what we mean is ABO indexed for prices.
24,25 Supposing that 
somebody has worked 20 out of 40 years given the benefit formula is expressed in terms of 
final pay (wage or salary) and years worked, ABO is half of the present value, given the 
discount rate, of what the end-40 years' entitlement would be if no allowance was made 
for possible future pay increases, whether from promotions or general increases in real pay 
rates. The real value of the entitlement accrued to date is preserved at the time of maturity. 
It follows that I) either estimates of price-indexed ABO must project future price increases 
and in doing so, they discount projected final price-indexed pay of 20 years ahead to the 
present, using a nominal interest rate which includes the same expectation of inflation or, 
alternatively, II) one must use today's real pay as the projected real pay in 20 years' time, 
and discount back by a real interest rate. 
PBO is defined in the following way: It represents the entitlement today based on a 
projection of eventual entitlements at retirement. Thus, after 20 years out of 40 years' 
service, the pension amount induced by the projected final pay level after 40 years of 
service including the impact of likely promotions as well as general wage growth is 
calculated, halved (20 out of 40 years), and today's entitlement is expressed by discounting 
it. In addition to promotions, the projection of eventual entitlements takes into account 
projected real increases in pay at the current grade and other grades, up to the time of 
retirement. Increases to reflect inflation are taken out, if the discount rate is expressed in 
real terms, otherwise they are included in both projected final pay levels and the discount 
rate. 
                                                            
24 This definition is adapted from John Walton (member of the Eurostat/ECB Task Force) who kindly took 
stand to the difference between ABO and PBO. He points out that “ABO indexed for prices” is often referred 
to as IBO (indexed benefit obligations). But due to the fact that IBO is also regarded as another form of PBO in 
some cases, we work with “ABO indexed for prices” which in the following shall be called “ABO” for 
simplification reasons. 
25 Please note that the explanations for both ABO and PBO are based on a benefit formula which depends on 
the final pay before retirement only. We are well aware of the fact that most of the European pension systems 
take into consideration a longer history of contributions when it comes to the calculation of first paid 
pensions. In this case, the difference between ABO and PBO also depends on how former contributions are 
considered in relation to present contributions, or in other words: How are former contributions valorised at 
the point of retirement. 
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 This means that when referring to PBO the only factor that reduces the employee’s 
pension entitlement in comparison with the retiree’s pension entitlement is the smaller 
amount of years into service – in our example 20 out of 40 years. When applying ABO, not 
only the smaller amount of working years is considered, but also the generally lower 
payment in that time period, regardless if it stems from personal or general wage 
increases. This leads to the assumption that PBO entitlements will in most cases be higher 
than ABO entitlements, simply because ABO does not allow for future personal or general 
wage increases.
26 
Implementation of ABO and PBO in the Freiburg model 
As described previously in this chapter, we estimate pension entitlements by calculating 
future pension payments. This is – simplistically said – done by projecting present age-sex-
specific pension payments into the future, taking into account the indexation of the 
respective pension scheme as well as any pension reforms which have been decided 
already and will have an impact on future pensions. In order to receive the ADL of a 
pension scheme, it is crucial to divide the beneficiaries of future pension payments into 
two groups: The first group consists of persons who receive pension payments already 
today. The members of this group dispose of full pension entitlements due to the fact that 
they have already retired and are not able to increase their pensions by paying 
contributions.
27 It follows that in our model the pension payments of this group – the 
“existing retirees” (or more precisely: persons who are already in retirement in the base 
year) – are projected in line with the relevant indexation until the last retiree dies.  
The second group consists of persons who do not receive pension payments yet. They 
have earned some kind of pension entitlements in the past – regardless if they just took up 
employment one year ago or if they are close before retirement – and will probably earn 
more pension entitlements in the future, up to that point of time when they will retire. It 
follows that this group does not dispose of full pension entitlements yet. The ADL 
approach includes entitlements earned up to the base year only, therefore the projected 
future pension payments of a “future retiree” (or more precisely: a person who will retire 
                                                            
26 In an unlikely case of zero future wage increases – neither from promotions nor from increases of the 
general wage level – ABO and PBO entitlements would be the same. Moreover, there are situations 
imaginable where ABO entitlements could exceed PBO’s. This would be the case if either the general future 
real wage growth is assumed to be negative or if personal wage developments will decrease due to smaller 
wages for senior employees. 
27 This counts only for pension schemes which do not allow their beneficiaries to increase their pension after 
retirement, i.e. by taking up employment, paying contributions and thus augmenting their pension 
entitlements. 
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 after the base year)
28 has to be reduced. Here the question of ABO versus PBO enters the 
scene: 
In a first step, we will distance ourselves from the accrued-to-date idea, just as it is 
exercised in the model primarily. In every single year after the base year, new pensioners 
will enter the pension scheme. The question to be answered first is what the amount of the 
first paid benefit will be in relation to the new pensioners’ benefits in the base year. Let the 
amount of first paid pension – sometimes referred to as the primary insurance amount 
(PIA) – in the year ݐ be ݔሺݐሻ and the constant per-capita wage growth in real terms be ݃. 
When applying the PBO approach, the first paid pension will be defined like the following: 
(9)       + =+ 1 (1 ) tt xxg
Since ݃ is assumed to be constant over time, the first paid pension can also be expressed 
subject to the base year ܾ. 
(10)    
−
+ =+ 1 (1 )
tb
tb xxg  
Changing to the ABO approach, one has to bear in mind that no allowance is made for 
future pay increases. In the current case, only the general wage growth is observed. It 
follows that the first paid pension of a future year t in the ABO approach changes to: 
(11)       = tb xx
The difference between equations (10) and (11) can be explained by the different 
approaches of ABO and PBO. PBO takes into account general future wage growth while 
ABO does not consider any future changes of wage; the wage level of the base year is held 
constant in real terms.
29 
The second difference between ABO and PBO can be observed when reducing the 
primarily calculated full benefits of “new pensioners” according to the concept of ADL. The 
full benefits are reduced by a vector – the “accrued-to-date vector” –, which expresses the 
share of entitlements earned until the base year to the amount of entitlements which 
qualifies for a full pension. This share is given for every projection year. It is straightforward 
that the share decreases from a value close to one for primary pensions paid out shortly 
                                                            
28 Please note that “future retirees” involve all individuals that retire after the base year. In contrast to this, 
“new retirees” indicate individuals who retire in a certain year x in the future. Those individuals who retire in 
the year x will in that year enter the group of “future retirees”. In the year x +1 they will still be “future 
retirees” but not “new retirees” anymore. 
29 It is crucial that this only counts for the calculation of the first paid pension or PIA. When projecting a 
benefit which has already been paid out before, i.e. the indexation of existing benefits, a constant real wage 
growth is assumed. In this regard the ABO approach displays a schizophrenic world where in one situation 
future wage growth is considered and in the other it is not. 
10 
 after the base year up to a value of close to zero for primary pensions paid out in the far 
future. This vector is multiplied with the respective accounts of full pension entitlements 
and the outcome is the amount of pension entitlements earned up to the base year for 
every projection year, the accrued-to-date entitlements. The difference between ABO and 
PBO in this regard is given by the different consideration of personal wage increases 
during working life. Generally, the wage at the beginning of a career is less than the 
average wage and turns out somewhere above average closer to retirement – PBO takes 
this effect into account, ABO does not. 
Regarding the accrued-to-date vector in the PBO approach, only the missing amount of 
contribution years has to be taken into account, due to the fact that the full pension 
primarily calculated by the model includes assumptions for personal and general wage 
growth. Let the average age of entering the work force and collecting first pension 
entitlements be 20 years, and the average retirement age 60 years. It follows that for an 
individual aged 35 in the base year, the PBO accrued-to-date entitlements add up to 15/40 
of the full pension. According to this, the PBO accrued-to-date vector should show a value 
of 15/40 for this age group. 
Referring to the same example for the ABO approach, one does not only need to consider 
the 25 missing years up to the point of retirement, but also the wage (which has not 
developed up to the point of retirement) has to be taken into account. This means that in 
most cases the entitlements of an individual aged 35 in the base year will be less than 
15/40 of the full pension. The question of how large the difference between the ABO and 
PBO accrued-to-date vector will be is answered by age-specific wage profiles from the 
respective country which show the development of an average career’s wage.  
In summary, the difference between ABO and PBO consists of two parts. The first part is the 
general wage growth, in most cases connected to general economic growth. The second 
part is the development of wage during an average career. 
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 3  Data and Assumptions 
When calculating the ADL of a pension scheme, a comprehensive data set and a number of 
assumptions are needed. This section aims to introduce both the data (3.1) and the 
assumptions (3.2) to deploy the Freiburg model. In addition, we show an example of how 
the pension profiles used in the Freiburg model are calculated (3.3). We start by describing 
the essential data supply. 
3.1  Necessary data 
In general, four types of data are needed for the application of the Freiburg model. These 
types are given by population data, age-sex-specific pension benefits, aggregated pension 
expenditures for a certain base year and general characteristics of the pension scheme to 
be examined. 
Population data 
Projections of the base year population by age and sex should reach as much as a 
maximum of 100 years into the future.
30 Most EU member states publish population 
projections conducted by their national statistical bodies. However, these official estimates 
typically cover only a time span of 30 to 50 years and thus are not far-sighted enough to 
meet the requirements of ADL. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct our own projections 
which prolong official forecasts. The starting point of the population projections used in 
this study is the population structure by age and sex observed at the start of the respective 
base years 2005, 2006 and 2007; the respective data is taken from Eurostat. This also 
counts for fertility and mortality rates in the base year.
31  
Age-sex-specific pension benefits 
This data is normally taken from micro-data surveys such as the Survey on Household 
Income and Wealth (SHIW) in Italy or the Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) from the DIW 
(German Institute for Economic Research) in Berlin, Germany. However, in many cases the 
administration body of the pension scheme provides age-sex-specific data regarding the 
recipience of pension payments. As this data encompasses the full category of persons in 
question instead of a (representative) sample, it is used preferably. In the case of our 
calculations
32 by order of the Eurostat/ECB Contact Group mentioned above, age-sex-
                                                            
30 This corresponds to the assumption that the maximum age is D=100. 
31 As we point out in section 2.1, migration may be disregarded when accounting for ADL; thus it is generally 
assumed to be zero. However, for pension schemes enhancing regulations which also depend on future 
migration, the respective migration is taken from Eurostat as well. 
32 See Müller et al. (2009). 
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 specific pension benefits have been supplied by national central banks or national 
statistical bodies. 
Pension expenditures 
As explained in step 2 of section 2.1 of this paper, the pension scheme’s expenditures of 
the base year are necessary to re-scale the age-sex-specific pension profiles. These budget 
figures are generally taken from national accounts’ statistics.  
Characteristics of the pension scheme 
The design of a pension scheme represents a crucial point when calculation its ADL. This 
involves the following main issues: 
•  Classification of the pension scheme (DB, NDC, hybrid system) 
•  Consideration of past contributions 
•  Indexation of existing pensions 
•  Necessary years of service to receive a full pension 
•  Regulations regarding early and late retirement 
The sources of these pieces of information are manifold; both international pension 
surveys
33 and country-specific pension literature contain comprehensive descriptions of 
the constructions of the various pension schemes. Furthermore, experience shows that the 
support of national experts is a vital source, too. 
3.2  General assumptions 
As stated above, a whole set of assumptions has to be taken when computing pension 
liabilities. The possibly strongest assumption states that fiscal policy will not change over 
time. In other words, the design of the pension scheme to be examined will stay 
indefinitely constant at the status quo of the base year including all the settings which 
have been displayed in section 3.1. The remaining assumptions used in the Freiburg model 
will be introduced here: 
Growth rate and discount rate 
The projection of future age-specific pension benefits demands an assumption regarding 
the annual rate of wage growth. Since any long-term forecast of future growth must 
remain arbitrary, we do not make use of sophisticated forecasts. Instead, a supposedly 
constant rate of wage growth is applied in all future periods. The growth rate is set to 
approximate the average long-term rate of productivity growth observed in the past. 
                                                            
33 See for example European Commission (2007), MISSOC (2009) or OECD (2007). 
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 Considered that the correct value of the growth parameter is uncertain, we have not 
attempted to design specific growth patterns for the individual EU member states. We 
employ a growth rate of 1.5 per cent per annum in real terms. However, this procedure is 
open for discussions, and by using varying wage growth paths for different countries one 
might be able to show the impacts of diverging economic developments on the pension 
liabilities of the different countries in a more adequate way. 
Similar to the growth rate parameter, forecasts regarding the prospective interest rate 
development are uncertain. Therefore, irrespective of national peculiarities, we apply a 
single uniform discount rate to take all pensions back to the base year. A reasonable range 
of interest rate assumptions is determined by the fact that public expenditures are 
significantly more uncertain than non-risky long-term government bonds on the one 
hand, but not as volatile as the return on risky assets on the other hand.  
We generally opt for the lower bounds of the discount rate. Therefore we normally choose 
a standard real discount rate of three per cent per annum, which reflects the ten-year 
average of Euro area ten-year government bond yields.  
At this point it is worth mentioning that the use of a constant discount rate as well as a 
constant wage growth rate implies a serious simplification. In general, more 
comprehensive sensitivity analyses could take account for possible variations of these 
parameters. This also counts for the other key economic parameters (unemployment rates 
and participation rates respectively), or changes in the behaviour of economic actors.
34 
Fertility, mortality and migration 
Following the component method, the age composition of the population is updated in 
each year by first subjecting the initial population structure to age-sex-specific mortality. 
Subsequently, the respective age-specific birth rates are applied for every projection year. 
The implementation of the component method requires assumptions with respect to the 
future development of age-specific mortality. The country-specific mortality rates are 
parameterised according to the assumptions of the baseline variant of the Eurostat 
population projection (EUROPOP). Fertility rates are assumed to be constant, and 
migration is disregarded due to reasons explained in section 2.1. 
   
                                                            
34 We will discuss this issue in further detail in section 4. 
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 3.3  Case study for calculating age-sex-specific pension profiles 
For an ease of understanding, in the following we show a case study for the calculation of 
age-sex-specific pension profiles by demonstrating step 2 to 5 of section 2.1 for the case of 
the social security pension scheme in Germany for average males (see Figure 1 to 
Figure 5).
35 
As outlined in section 2.1, the estimation of the base year average existing retirees’ 
benefits by age is the centre piece of the projection. This is done by aggregating a benefit 
profile by age and sex over the base year population and then re-evaluating it in a way that 
the aggregates based on micro-profiles and population data correspond to the respective 
government budget aggregates in the base year.
36 
Figure 1: Rescaled profile of average existing retirees’ benefits in 2006 






































age in 2006  
Source: Own calculations 
Figure 1 shows an average rescaled profile of existing retirees’ benefits for the living male 
cohorts in the year 2006. The increasing profile after the age of 50 years reflects an 
                                                            
35 Please note that in this case study wage growth rates have been set to zero. 
36 Since our projection method does not correct aggregates for business cycle effects, base year economic 
performance is perpetuated indefinitely. This may lead to a bias. Nonetheless this effect seems not as critical 
in case of considering pension expenditures only since they are for the most part dominated by 
demography. 
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 increasing share of pension cases. The decreasing profile for older cohorts results from past 
differences in working careers and indexation rules.
37 
To account for future cohort-specific development of existing retirees pension benefits, we 
phase out year-by-year the rescaled age-sex-specific existing retirees’ profile and index the 
pension benefits according to the benefit formula (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Phasing out of average existing retirees’ benefits profile from the year 2006 to 2045 


























































age in year y
2006 2015 2025 2035 2045
 
Source: Own calculations 
As an intermediate step we develop the annual new retirees’ benefits by taking the 
difference of the rescaled base year profile of the existing retirees pension benefit. We do 
this until the age of 67 because after this age-year, new retirees’ benefits are negligible (see 
Figure 3).
38 This treatment allows designing maturation effects for future retirees’ cohorts 
and is necessary since the existing retirees’ benefit profile after the age of 67 is not a good 
predictor for future retirees’ benefits. This is due to the fact that both average benefits and 
the share of pension cases vary substantially across existing retirees cohorts reflecting past 
differences in working careers. Note that this proceeding nonetheless maintains base year 
economic structures for new retirees indefinitely. In particular, the analysis thus abstracts 
                                                            
37 At this point it is worth mentioning that we employ age-sex-specific pension data which is broken down 
into one-year intervals. Most former surveys use five-year interval data which can lead to inaccuracies 
especially when looking at the cohorts retiring in. 
38 Please note that this does not count in case the age-sex-specific survivor pensions are available. In this case 
we consider the difference of the rescaled base year profile until the age of 90 in order to take into account 
widow’s pensions in a more accurate way. After this age, the data usually is non-representative due to small 
numbers of cases in the age cohorts above 90. 
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 from changes in labour force participation and unemployment rates for future new 
retirees’ benefits. 
Figure 3: Rescaled profile of average new retirees’ benefits for 2006 







































age in 2006  
Source: Own calculations 
These average new retirees’ benefits are finally built up year-by-year to project future 
retirees’ benefits.  At the same time the payments firstly need to be valorised and secondly, 
upon retirement, indexed according to the benefit formula. Thirdly, the level effects of 
legal amendments which had been passed into law in or prior to the base year but not yet 
come into full fiscal effect are taken into account. Figure 4 shows the development of 
future retirees’ pension benefits for selective years. As can be seen after being built up 
almost completely (year 2055), in the case of Germany the profile is considerably lower as 
the existing retirees profile (see Figure 4). This is due to reforms which are explained in 
detail in Müller et al. (2009). 
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 Figure 4: Build-up of average future (existing) retirees’ pension benefits profile from year 2006 to 2055 


























































age in year y
2006 2015 2025 2035 2045 2055
 
Source: Own calculations 
In a final step Figure 5 reduces the future retirees’ benefits to account for the accrued-to-
date part only. Due to the fact that in this case PBO is applied to, we cut the benefits 
linearly according to the ratio of (years in the job until base year) to (average years in the 
job).
39  
                                                            
39 For further explanations see section 2.2. 
18 
 Figure 5: Accrued-to-date amount of average future retirees’ pension benefits profile from 2006 to 2055 


























































age in year y
2006 2015 2025 2035 2045 2055
 
Source: Own calculations 
For ease of understanding we add at this point Figure 6 showing the development of the 
projected aggregates. The sum of the existing retirees benefits decreases due to the 
phasing out of the profiles. In contrast to this, the aggregated future retirees’ benefits 
show an inverse u-shaped pattern. This is due to the fact that the future retirees’ benefits 
initially increase as a result of the building up of the profile. However, these benefits are 
reduced accordingly since only the accrued-to-date amount is considered. 
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 Figure 6: Future pension expenditures 
















































Source: Own calculations 
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 4  Limitations and possible extensions 
When setting up a model one is confronted with the classical trade-off between simplicity 
and accuracy. On the one hand the model should reflect reality as precise as possible. On 
the other hand models are by definition abstractions of reality; and therein lies one of their 
major strengths. They display a complex phenomenon in a simple and clear manner and 
therefore have to leave out irrelevant information. Hence, the crucial question when 
setting up models is: What are the relevant input factors to be chosen? We have answered 
this question with the description of assumptions and input data in section 3. In the 
following we will take a closer look on the resulting limitations of the Freiburg model. In 
this context, we give various examples taken from our survey to the Eurostat/ECB Contact 
Group.
40 Furthermore, a divergent answer to the above raised question shall be given and 
possible extensions of the model – i.e. additional relevant input factors – shall be 
considered. 
To understand the outcomes of the model it is essential to grasp the channels which lead 
to the respective results. In this context it is of interest how the outcomes change if one 
varies the assumptions taken. Sensitivity analyses which assess the robustness of a model 
are useful tools for this purpose. They give an indication to which extent the model is 
driven by the taken assumptions. 
Table 1 illustrates the respective sensitivity analysis for the ADL of the German public 
pension system (base year 2006). Looking at these results a significant limitation of the 
Freiburg model becomes obvious. Given a small alteration of the assumed interest rate (r) 
from three to two percent the outcome changes considerably by 21 percent (using the 
PBO approach). Also the level of the growth rate (g) has a sensitive impact on the results of 
the Freiburg model – as shown in Table 1. Since the future is uncertain by nature, this 
constraint of the model cannot be overcome. Nevertheless, the sensitivity analysis 
demonstrates once again the importance of choosing appropriate assumptions. 
   
                                                            
40 See Müller et al. (2009). 
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 Table 1: Sensitivity analysis of the German social security pension scheme (ADL) 
Parameters  Amount of ADL  
(relative deviation to 
standard scenario)  r g 
2.0% 1.0%  9.6% 
2.0% 1.5%  21.0% 
2.0% 2.0%  34.2% 
3.0% 1.0%  -8.5% 
3.0%  1.5%  0.0% 
3.0% 2.0%  9.8% 
4.0% 1.0%  -22.1% 
4.0% 1.5%  -15.6% 
4.0% 2.0%  -8.2% 
   Source: Own calculations 
Noting that the taken assumptions have a large influence on the results, the question 
arises which level of interest and growth rate should be chosen when examining different 
countries – as done in Müller et al. (2009). The choice lies in heterogeneous or 
homogeneous presumptions. 
The former option is supported by the fact that countries widely differ in their 
development and therefore can be assumed to follow different growth and interest paths 
in the future. Nevertheless, we choose equal assumptions for all countries examined in our 
EU-comparison. Two main arguments play a role for this decision: predictability  and 
comparability. Forecasting the demographic development for the coming decades is 
relatively straightforward since the future population can be assumed to be compounded 
to a large degree of the present population. However, predicting the development of 
economic growth and interest rates is rather demanding and connected with a great deal 
of uncertainty. Not only do economic indicators depend on numerous variables – and are 
therefore difficult to predict – but also do they feature a large volatility.
41 Hence, the lack of 
ability to predict the future development of economic growth and interest rates is one 
important rationale for choosing identical assumptions in our cross-country comparison. 
Another reason in favour of homogeneous assumptions across countries is an enhanced 
comparability of results.
42 Heterogeneous assumptions which are often based on national 
forecasts – and which themselves are often based on dissimilar presumptions – would 
                                                            
41 For an overview on the main determinants of economic growth see Mankiw et al. (1992) or Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (2003). 
42 See Franco et al. (2004), p. 16. 
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 make the outcomes less comparable and therefore more vulnerable in the political 
discussion. Since the calculation of pension liabilities represents a highly political issue – 
especially in the context of the Maastricht treaty and the current discussion of government 
insolvency – the political dimension of calculating pension liabilities should not be 
neglected. Nevertheless, homogeneous interest and growth rates limit the model to the 
extent that country-specific particularities cannot be accounted for. 
Current research indicates and quantifies that the ageing process has a significant and 
heterogeneous impact on economic growth in EU-countries.
43 As pointed out before, the 
future ageing development can be predicted relatively well. Therefore, the Freiburg model 
could be extended taking ageing-specific growth forecasts into account. However, in this 
context it is necessary to ensure that such growth-predictions are detached from policy 
considerations and that the agencies assigned to produce such forecasts represent 
independent bodies. 
A further limitation to mention is straightforward and counts for every model: the model 
can only be as accurate as the given input data. This aspect represents a constraint 
especially for the calculation of pension reforms and of cohort-specific pension levels.  
Particularly when modelling pension reforms commonly a lot of information is required. A 
short example shall illustrate this: Several pension systems in Europe implemented 
changes regarding the amount of the maximum pension. For example in Portugal a 
pension ceiling was introduced with the reform of 2006. Bulgaria on the contrary decided 
to let the maximum pension limit expire after the year 2009. In order to model such 
reforms comprehensive data about the distribution of reference earnings is necessary. 
Unfortunately, in many cases such detailed information is not available. As a consequence, 
various reforms cannot be accounted for accurately – or sometimes not at all – in our 
calculations due to the limitation of input data.
44  
The same counts for possible side effects of pension reforms. Various countries enacted 
pension reforms in the recent years which significantly lower future pension levels. 
However, such reductions of pension levels can be significantly cushioned by the existence 
of minimum pensions. In other words, a pension reduction can be limited to the extent 
that pension levels in some countries cannot fall under a certain threshold, given by the 
                                                            
43 It can be assumed that economic growth per capita in the EU25 will be lowered by roughly one third due 
to the ageing process in the coming decades. However, this effect varies between each EU-country. For an 
extensive view on the long term economic growth in the EU25 see Carone et al. (2006). 
44 Changes in the recognized insurance periods – such as crediting for child care or education periods – could 
not be considered in our calculations either due to a lack of data.  
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 amount of the minimum pension.
45 Since we normally do not have information about the 
distribution of pension levels we are not able to implement this side effect. A possible 
future extension of the Freiburg model could implement probabilities of receiving a 
minimum pension in the calculations. But it has to be stated once again that such an 
extension greatly depends on the quality of data supply. 
Moreover, due to a lack of input data cohort effects cannot be considered in the Freiburg 
model either. Within our concept of measuring pension liabilities we take a look at the 
past, due to the fact that pension data reflects the insurance history of pensioners – such 
as past employment rates, business cycles and wages. However, we usually have no 
information about the insurance history of cohorts which are presently contributing into 
the system. In this sense the approach of the Freiburg model is comparable to an 
observation of planets located a long way off in the universe. While observing these 
planets we actually get a view of previous times – since the light takes a long time to reach 
the earth from these far away celestial bodies.
46  
Due to the limit of input data we have to  assume that the pension level of future 
pensioners – or in other words of present contributors – will be the same as the pension 
level of new pensioners in the base year. As a result the pension level of future pensioners 
will only differ from the new pensioners’ pension level in the base year due to pension 
reforms and indexation rules. Summarizing, the above outlined characteristic – one could 
call it the distant planet characteristic – of the Freiburg model confines the accuracy of the 
calculations by ignoring cohort effects. But this limitation can also be interpreted as its 
strength since it significantly limits the amount of information necessary for the 
calculation. Therefore, the model fits very well if only a limited amount of data can be 
provided – as it is mostly the case when undertaking large country comparisons. 
There is also another significant limitation to be mentioned: The introduced model does 
not take into account future behavioural changes. So far we suppose that future 
                                                            
45 We assume that pension reductions of the latest pension reform particularly in France, Hungary and 
Portugal will be cushioned due to existing minimum pensions. 
46 Cohort effects should play a more significant role for the ADL the longer the reference contribution period 
in a pension system is – i.e. the further away the observed planet – and the more the present pension data 
reflects the further past. Another example shall illustrate this: German pensions are based and calculated on 
the entire career history. Therefore, for a present new pensioner his entire contributions over the last 
approximately 40 years are considered in the pension calculation. Of course, also periods of unemployment 
or self employment are reflected in the pension level. Due to increasing unemployment and self employment 
rates in recent decades the level of future pensioners can be expected to differ from the present values (see 
SVR (2007), p. 195). We assume that the more the pension system is based on the principle of equivalence – 
for example taking into account a long reference contribution period – the more the level of pensions for 
each age group will differ. In some countries such cohort effects however only play minor roles, for instance 
in the Netherlands. The calculation of Dutch pensions does not depend on the level of past income but only 
on the periods of residence in the Netherlands between the age of 15 and 65. For a description of the Dutch 
pension system see MISSOC (2009). 
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 pensioners will take the same retirement decisions as their present counterparts.
47 But 
what happens if future new pensioners will change their behaviour and retire significantly 
later (earlier) than today? The answer to this question depends on respective pension 
scheme examined. If the pension increments (decrements) for late (early) retirement can 
be considered actuarial neutral the behavioural changes should have no impact on our 
results.
48 However, as Queisser and Whitehouse (2006) indicate numerous pension systems 
in the OECD cannot be considered actuarial neutral. A substantial number of countries 
does subsidize early retirement and penalize late retirement since pension decrements as 
well as increments are lower than an actuarial neutral rate. As a consequence, we would 
overestimate (underestimate) pension liabilities if future pensioners will decide to retire 
later (earlier) than today. In Table 2 we demonstrate the impact of a change in pension 
behaviour for the case of Germany. As illustrated, a postponement of the retirement by 
one (two) year(s) lowers the ADL for Germany by 2.7 (5.2) per cent.
49 Consequently, 
a possible extension of the Freiburg model could take into account predictions of future 
pension behaviour – similar to Berkel and Börsch-Supan (2004). However, we suppose the 
data basis to forecast pension behaviour within a large cross-country comparison is 
presently not available. 
Table 2: Impact of a change in retirement behaviour on ADL 
Behavioural change  Amount of ADL 
(relative deviation to standard scenario) 
Postponed retirement by one year  - 2.7 % 
Postponed retirement by two years  - 5.2 % 
Source: Own calculations 
Another possible extension of the Freiburg model concerns the inclusion of employment 
rates. Applying the ABO approach we account for different age-specific gross wages over 
the life cycle – as it has been outlined in section 2.2. However, pension entitlements 
depend not only on gross wages over the life cycle but also on the periods in which these 
                                                            
47 In addition, in case of pension reforms which lead to an increase of the statutory retirement age we assume 
that the pension behaviour is unaltered, effective retirement age stays constant and the respective retirees 
put up with resulting pension decrements. However, an exemption is made when the minimum retirement 
age is increased within the framework of a pension reform – for example in Austria (with the reforms of 2000 
and 2003) or in the UK (with the reform of 2007). In such cases we increase in our calculations also the 
effective retirement age by the respective years.  
48 Actuarial neutrality in the context of pension systems means that the present value of accrued pension 
benefits does not change due to an earlier or later pension start date. For a detailed description of this 
concept see Queisser and Whitehouse (2006). 
49 For the calculation of these figures we assumed that from the year 2010 onwards all future new retirees 
aged 60 to 67 will postpone their retirement by one (two) year(s). The outcome greatly depends on the 
country-specific pension regulations – namely the pension increments and decrements – as well as the 




                                                          
wages have been earned – in other words periods of employment. Therefore, it would be 
consistent to include also employment rates – which can greatly differ over the life cycle 
and between countries – in the calculation of ABO pension liabilities.
50 We assume that 
this extension would slightly lower the (ABO) results of the Freiburg model. Two aspects 
play a role for this assumption: First of all, employment rates of the age groups 55 to 60 
years old are relatively low in comparison to other cohorts. Secondly, pension benefits of 
these older age groups are relatively large since they are less discounted – being paid in 
the nearer future – than coming pension benefits of younger cohorts. In case of an 
extension of the model with respect to employment rates, the necessary input data could 
be taken from Eurostat. 
In various countries the entitlement of a pension is dependent on a minimum period of 
membership or contribution in the pension system (MPC). For example, in Italy 20 years 
(for people insured before the year 1996) of contribution are necessary to receive a 
pension entitlement while in Belgium no minimum period of membership in the pension 
system is required.
51  Looking at these country-specific differences the question arises 
whether dissimilar MPC should be taken into account when calculating ADL. An argument 
in favour could be the following thought experiment: Imagine the pension system will be 
terminated and provisions will have to be made for all pension entitlements accrued-to-
date. What does this imply for the calculation of ADL? Would Italy have to make fewer 
provisions since it has implemented a longer MPC than Belgium, given the ceteris paribus 
condition? Intuition would say yes. But since we cannot be certain about such a political 
outcome we do not consider regulations regarding MPC in our model. It is nevertheless 
worth debating to extent the model by such MPC. But it also has to be noted that this 
would alter the results significantly – as shown in Table 3. In the case of Italy the ADL 
would be lowered by roughly eleven per cent when considering MPC, while in Belgium on 
the contrary such an extension of the model would have no impact on the results. 
 
50 See Eurostat (2009). Of course employment rates can also differ between cohorts. Since the data basis for 
an implementation of cohort specific employment rates is rather limited we would only recommend the 
consideration of country- and age-specific employment rates in the model.  
51 For an overview about the country-specific legal frameworks see MISSOC (2009). 27 
 
Table 3: Impact of a consideration of minimum contribution periods on ADL
52 
Country (MPC)  Amount of ADL (relative deviation to standard scenario) 
Italy (20 years)  -11 %   
Lithuania (15 years)  -7 %   
Germany (5 years)  -1 %   
Belgium (0 years)  0 %   
Source: Own calculations 
Summarizing, the Freiburg model – like every model – clearly simplifies reality by using a 
limited set of input factors and assumptions. This feature leads to a number of limitations 
of the model discussed above. But it can also be considered as its strength since pension 
liabilities being a complex value can be estimated in a straightforward way. Therefore, the 
model fits very well when only a limited amount of data can be provided, as it is mostly the 
case in extensive country comparisons. Nevertheless, various extensions of the model – 
such as a consideration of employment rates, ageing specific growth rates or minimum 
contribution periods – are worth to be discussed and could be implemented in the 
Freiburg model without too many difficulties. 
                                                            
52 Since we do not have information about the age-sex-specific contribution history we had to approximate 
the below given numbers. This estimation is based on the assumption that contributors which are younger 
than a certain threshold (= number of MPC in years + 1 + average age to enter the workforce in the 
respective country) have not accrued any entitlements. It is evident that the ADL turn out increasingly lower 
the higher the number of MPC considered. This is caused by the fact that with an increasing MPC not only 
more contributors fall under the above defined threshold but also are these contributors on average older 
and therefore increasingly higher entitlements remain out of consideration.  28 
 
5  Summary and outlook 
With the demographic challenges ahead, the calculation of ADL offers a valuable tool to 
evaluate pension systems under various perspectives. First of all, this approach helps to 
assess the costs of terminating unfunded public pension schemes. The concept of ADL also 
represents a useful tool to examine various pension reforms – such as changes in pension 
indexations or minimum retirement ages – and their impact on pension entitlements. 
Moreover, measuring ADL can give a further insight when looking on the impact of PAYG 
pension schemes on national savings. In this context, ADL quantifies the social security 
wealth which represents a significant determinant on saving rates – as has been pointed 
out first by Feldstein (1974). With the current revision of the 1993 SNA and the resulting 
implementation of ADL in national accounts a further impetus has been given to pay 
attention to the concept of ADL.  
This paper introduces the approach of the Freiburg model to quantify ADL. The presented 
model has been applied to carry out benchmark calculations of 19 EU member states on 
behalf of the Eurostat/ECB Contact Group on Pensions.  After a short introduction, in 
section 2 we outlined the calculation procedure of the Freiburg model step by step. 
Section 3 gave an overview of the general assumptions and the data supply necessary for 
the application of the model. The following section 4 revealed that the Freiburg model 
entails a large degree of simplification using a limited set of input factors. This leads to a 
major strength of the model: It fits very well when only a limited amount of data can be 
provided – as it is mostly the case for undertaking large country comparisons. 
Furthermore, section 4 presented possible extensions of the Freiburg model such as a 
consideration of ageing specific growth rates or minimum contribution periods which are 
worth to be discussed. 
Besides these possible extensions of the Freiburg model, several interesting issues could 
be raised for future research. One concerns the field of application. So far the concept of 
ADL has only been carried out for calculating entitlements of pension systems. But one 
may argue that entitlements exist also in other fields of unfunded social security systems 
as for example long term care insurance. Therefore, future research could extend the 
concept of ADL also to other social security systems which are based on a PAYG principle.  29 
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